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By L.

of the Denver Bar.
Given at 26th Annual Meeting of the U. S. Chamber of
Commerce, Washington, D. C., May 4, 1938.

WHEN

WARD BANNISTER,

I noticed that on the program the name of

WColorado followed that of Denver as my home address, I was a little peeved. It seemed to me that
Denver was well enough known not to need any identification of its statehood. Observing that the little town of
Los Angeles was treated similarly did not change my feelings.
It was only when I saw, in connection with other appearances upon the program, that the members of this Chamber
have to be told that even the City of New York is in the
State of New York, that my indignation was appeased in
recognition of the ignorance common to the members of this
Chamber.
"An Appraisal of Proposals for National and Regional
Planning," meaning in respect to our national resources, is
the subject that Jim Owens, only Director and Chairman
here, but in Oklahoma a Cherokee Chief, has assigned to me,
and to which I shall stick as close as do the moccasins on his
own feet. That national planning is necessary to the conservation of our soil, waters, forests and minerals is clear.
There are monster rivers to be held in leash, especially in the
eastern half of the continent; land areas to be reforested both
in the East and West, and forests to be protected; soil erosions
to be checked and lands to be reclaimed through irrigation.
These things we do partly for ourselves, but more that we
may transmit to the coming generations a patrimony that
will make their lives endurable and keep America great.
The task is often too much for the individual. It is
too great for his purse, and his life expectancy is not long
enough that he may calculate upon adequate reward. It is
147
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too much for a corporation, and often for even the state.
Necessity, therefore, imposes much of the duty upon the
government. For its discharge there must be planning, not
only on a national scale but by the nation.
National planning we have already-national planning
by the Corps of Army Engineers in the control of floods in
order to conserve farm lands and cities; by the Bureau of
Reclamation in order to reclaim lands by the application of
water rather than to allow the water to run in waste to the
sea; by the Forest Service to protect existing forests and
create others; by the Soil Conservation Service, to encourage
fertilization and. to protect from erosion that top layer of
nourishing vegetable decay or humus to create a single inch
of which requires a century. These various agencies not
only plan but, when authorized so to do by the Congress,
execute plans by constructing projects and carrying on activities.
The National Resources Committee functioning under
a 1935 Executive Order, and availing itself in part of the
data of other departments, but also adding the results of its
own researches, has done a notable piece of work in the field
of water uses. The work has been marred somewhat by the
failure to recognize -states as states in the planned distribution
of water-uses from streams that are interstate in character,
thus ignoring the legal factor, as distinguished from the engineering, in water problems. I have often thought, and when
no engineers have been present, have ventured to suggest:
that a water engineer and a water lawyer are alike in one
respect, namely, each is only half a man, but that they differ
in this: that while the water lawyer knows this, the water
engineer apparently does not. I hope there are no engineers
present, or if so that the rest of you will protect me.
With national planning already in existence by various
agencies of the government--competent at that-what more
is needed? The answer is a coordinating statutory agency.
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Call it a National Resources Board if you will, the primary
function of which would be: not to construct and operate
projects authorized by the Congress, but rather to investigate,
consider and coordinate the plans of the other federal agencies now acting more or less independently, and of states and
municipalities; to coordinate these plans and present to the
Congress and the President those of the plans favored by the
Board, subject to the approval of the federal agencies regularly charged with the planning in the particular field concerned.
In any organized scheme of national planning we cannot put soil, water, minerals and forests in airtight compartments. Complete conservation of one of these resources
involves and affects the others. Not only is this true physically but financially as well. It may be a bit old fashioned to
suggest that there is any ceiling on national expenditures short
of Orion and the Pleiades. Yet a limit does exist, and must
be kept in mind, along with the needs of the different areas
of our country, in determining the relative importance and
the order of conservation plans to be put forward to the
Congress and the President.
Such a Board should consist partly of representatives of
the Departments of War, Interior and Agriculture, under one
or the other of which most of the planning agencies referred
to are now functioning, but more largely of members chosen
from the various areas, to the end that the interests of the
entire country may be reflected in the investigations of the
Board and the plans that it would submit to the Congress
and the President. These members should be appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
This proposal of a federal coordinating agency is a
simple one. It avoids duplicating the investigations of other
existing agencies; it provides expert opinion upon the relative value of different plans scrutinized in the process of
coordination; it recognizes financial limitations and the in-
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terests of the country as a whole, and plans the activities accordingly.
It sets up no regions with regional agencies or satrapies
to lord it over the states. It gets along with existing federal
agencies but coordinates their plans, presents the best of them
to the Congress and the President, and leaves to the Congress
the question of adoption and appropriation.
There are pending in the Congress the Norris, Hayden,
the original Mansfield and the later Mansfield bills, popularly
called Regional Authority or Little T.V.A. bills. Objection
does not lie to the ultimate purpose of any of these billsconservation and development of natural resources.
Decision, however, cannot be so unanimous as to the method.
Before judging the method, we must consider some preliminaries. Of the four resources-forests, minerals, soil
and waters-the first two, namely, forests and minerals, are
geographically fixed. The same thing is true of the soil,
except for that part of it that thumbs a ride on wind or
stream. The fourth, water, is an element that, because of
its migratory habit, raises questions of interstate character.
In the eastern half of the continent those questions are
principally of dams and levees for flood control; the acquisition of rights-of-way for these devices; the division of costs
as between the government and the states and as between
the states themselves; the ownership and operation of the
dams and power plants, whether by the government, or the
state, or private enterprise, and the extent to which settlement
of these questions may be had by interstate compact. There
are also in the East the questions of diverting water from
one watershed into another, as, for instance, in the controversy between Connecticut and Massachusetts from the headwaters of the Connecticut River into the area surrounding
the City of Boston; and in the controversy between New
Jersey and New York over the diversion of waters from the
drainage basin of the Delaware into that of the Hudson.
In the western half of the country water is scarce. Said
the tenderfoot to the cowboy, as they rode along the banks
of one of the Western streams, "There seems to be a lot of
water down there."
"Yes," said the cowboy, "it looks as if there is more
than there is but there ain't."
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Later the tenderfoot and the cowboy came to a dug-out,
on the door of which was pasted this notice: "Gone for water,
back Thursday."
While this situation is not so bad by any means as the
story indicates, yet the water is scarce, and it is wanted for
municipal, industrial and irrigation supplies. The interstate
questions are principally, how to conserve and develop this
resource in such wise by location and size of project as to make
a fair distribution of water-uses as between the states, and
also the extent to which interstate compacts, under the leadership of the government, may be used in the accomplishment
of this aim. Here, too, as in the East there are also interstate
questions arising through the transfer of water from one
drainage basin to another, and involving more than a single
state.
In this country two systems of water law prevail-the
riparian and the appropriation.
Roughly speaking, the
former in the statesFast of the Missouri and the latter west.
The fundamental principle of the riparian system is that
each land ownership contiguous to the stream has a legal
right to a reasonable use of the waters of a stream, subject
to a like right on the part of other contiguous land ownerships. All ownerships are entitled to at least some water.
The fundamental principle of the appropriation system,
on the other hand, is that the use of water is not limited to
land ownerships contiguous to the stream, and that water
users or appropriators, as they are called, are entitled to water
only in the order of their priority in point of time. Under
this principle there is then little or no water for the latest
appropriators. That, however, cannot be helped. The
water is scarce; there is no other principle that is so workable.
Now it is evident that where water uses are desired in
the East or West for industrial, municipal, recreational or
irrigation purposes, government financial aid to a project in
one state may well prove a detriment to another state on the
same stream. The other states, therefore, should keep a
watchful eye. The detriment might lie in the inability of
the other states to obtain financial aid for a project of its own
until the government shall first have gotten back its investment in the first state. This would be true in the East or West.
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Or the detriment might lie in the possibility that the priority
principle might be applied as between states, instead of merely
as among appropriators within the same state. In that event
the state receiving the project through the government's
financial aid might acquire a water priority against the state
not receiving it. The conclusion is that in the development
of water uses on interstate streams, whether in the East or
in the West, more attention should be paid than the government is bestowing now toward securing a fair distribution of
water uses to each state upon the same stream.
The Norris Bill would divide the country into seven
regions, there being a few instances where a state would be in
several regions-create a federal corporate Conservation
Authority for each region to plan the conservation of the four
resources, recommend plans to the Congress and the President and, if authorized by the Congress, then to carry out
the projects and activities authorized.
The original Mansfield Bill likewise would divide the
country into the same regions for planning purposes, set up
for each a Planning Agency, and, where power projects are
authorized by the Congress, would commit the project or
Under
projects to a federal corporate Power Authority.
either bill a President could transfer to the Authority other
power projects now or hereafter constructed. Under both
bills the supervision and control of these various agencies
would be in the line of Presidents.
The objections to these bills are insuperable. The bills
call for duplicating or superseding the numerous activities of
existing federal agencies, such as the Corps of Army Engineers, the Reclamation Bureau, the Soil Conservation Service
and the Forestry Service. They oust state courts of jurisdiction; they prohibit pollution of interstate streams in one
case altogether, and require the permission of the Conservation Authority in the other, instead of leaving the general
question of pollution, as now, to the states, which are the
ones most interested in the industries to be fostered.
They forbid interstate compacts, except in the one case,
with the consent of the Conservation Authority, and the
other with that of the President of the United States, although
the Federal Constitution invests Congress itself with the
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authority to do the consenting where interstate compacts are
involved.
The Norris Bill confers upon the Conservation Authorities the right to say when dams may be put in streams in any
state, and when, therefore, uses of water may be made therefrom. Both bills ignore possible interstate water priorities
and indicate no interest whatever in the question of whether
each state upon an interstate stream is to receive a fair allocation of the water uses of that stream. Both bills assert a general control over the waters in states to be in the United States,
whereas by law it is in the states themselves, subject only to
such intervention as the Congress itself in the exercise of its
wisdom may choose to direct under the commerce and national
defense clauses of the Constitution.
The Norris Bill increases centralization of political and
economic power in the federal government. True, the functions of the Corps of Army Engineers, the Soil Conservation
Service, the Forest Service and the Reclamation Bureau become more or less parceled out among seven Conservation
Authorities, but who controls these Regional Authorities?
The answer is whoever happens to be President of the United
States. Thus the appearances are deceiving, and there is
increased centralization of even federal functions. As for
state functions, the bill would supersede so many that the
subtraction from the powers of the states added to the Conservation Authorities only increases in this other respect the
political and economic power of a succession of Presidents.
Of the two bills, the Norris Bill is the Big Bad Wolf.
The original Mansfield Bill is the camel thrusting its head
under the tent-the body to enter later.
Senator Hayden is to be commended as the first to bring
forward a substitute for the original Mansfield bill.
The
substitute would create a centralized National Resources
Board that would plan for conservation and development,
but would have no part in the construction or operation of
the projects or the conduct of activities authorized by the
Congress as the result of plans adopted and financial appropriations made. Chairman Mansfield, of the Committee on
Rivers and Harbors, likewise is to be congratulated for bringing out a bill eliminating project work on the part of the
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bill's central National Resources Board and confining the
functions more strictly to planning.
Both the Hayden substitute and the new Mansfield Bill,
however, cling to the idea of fixed regions which do not seem
necessary, although.the Hayden bill makes the creation of
regions discretionary with the Board rather than mandatory.
Both bills would permit their respective central boards to go
afield in the researches and planning from the already existing'
planning agencies of the government, although the Mansfield
bill wisely requires the approval of the appropriate federal
agencies before the Board may submit its plans to the Congress. Neither bill definitely requires its Board to consult with
the states affected before the presentation of plans. If there are
to be regions, neither bill provides with clarity for interregional projects; in other words, for the diversion of water
from one region into another, yet if this cannot be done
human needs are being sacrificed to topography. Neither bill
contains any provision looking toward a fair distribution of
interstate water to each state concerned, or tending to protect
one state against a priority or an advantage in water-use
given by federal aid to another.
Both bills are to be commended for including as do the
Reclamation Act of 1902 and the Water Power Act of 1920,
clauses declaring against any intention to interfere with the
"laws" and "rights" of the "states" in respect to the control
of the waters within their boundaries. But this language,
although the best that could be framed, does not afford
adequate protection to the states, for the question at once
arises, what is meant by the "laws" or "rights" of the states?
If an act of the Congress is constitutional, can it be said to
invade the "laws" and "rights" of the state, even though
the laws of the state purport to be.contrary thereto? There
lies the doubt that in the words of Hamlet, "must give us
pause."
If the states would protect themselves they should
not depend upon such language alone, but stop unwanted
legislation, even though constitutional, at its very source.
This means that the undesirable features of these bills should
be eliminated, protective provisions added and the good preserved.
Somehow, I have the feeling, inspired by the reading of
these last two bills as compared with the Norris and the
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original Mansfield Bill, that Senator Hayden and Chairman
Mansfield have sensed the right direction, and that deep down
in their hearts there may be, after all, only the final desire to
establish a single planning agency to cooperate with the other
agencies, federal and state, to coordinate the work of the
federal planning agencies, and, with the approval of the
appropriate ones, present plans to the Congress for the latter's adoption.
Such are my appraisals of the Norris, the original Mansfield, the Hayden and the later Mansfield proposals for the
development of our natural resources. As for a proposal
more to my liking, it would be the one advanced in a general
way at the beginning of this address. It would be a proposal
for a single planning agency: to cooperate with other federal
planning agencies and with the states; to coordinate the plans
of the other federal agencies, conducting sufficient investigations of its own to coordinate intelligently; and then present
the plans of its choice to the Congress and the President.
Why could not the present National Resources Committee,
existing by Executive Order, be converted into such a statutory agency? There should be no regional planning agencies until experience at least demonstrates the desirability.
Members of the proposed Board should be made up partly
of representatives of the Departments of War, Interior and
Agriculture, but more largely from the various parts of the
country, and appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate. There would be provisions in any such bill
looking toward a fair share of interstate water to each state.
There would be no assertion of that hated doctrine of ownership of general control of the waters of the states, since general ownership or control is in the states and not in the government. There would be such provisions in the bill declaring the supremacy of the laws of the states as are now to
be found in the Hayden and the later Mansfield bills.
Why is the doctrine of federal ownership and control of
state waters so hated? The states of the East do not tolerate
it nor will the states of the West, although the states in both
regions recognize the authority of the federal government
under the commerce and national defense clauses of the Constitution.
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The eastern states imported their riparian system of
water law from France as the result of the studies, decisions
and writings of Storey and Kent. The appropriation or
priority law of the states of the far West was invented by
the people of the West. It began with the miners of California-those men of the red bandanna and gold-pan. The
late Justice Field, of the United States Supreme Court, helped
to develop that law when, as a judge of a miner's court, he
administered justice from behind a dry-goods box. The late
Moses Hallet, Federal District Judge of Colorado, having
been demoted by his placer mining partners from placer miner
and then to cook because he spent too much time studying
Blackstone, likewise became a judge in the miners' court in
Colorado, and there and later likewise put his hand to the
development of the same system of water law. That system
has spread from California until it is now recognized in 17
states of the West, by acts of Congress and by judicial decisions of the Supreme Court. Seven of those 17 states recognize riparian law in no particular whatsoever. The other
ten recognize it to a small extent, but are escaping from it as
rapidly as they know how. The government never had any
rights to water in the seven states, and such as it ever had in
any of the other ten, or in any of the 17, it disposed of under
acts of Congress of 1866 and 1877.
If by chance the government makes an appropriation of
water in one of these 17 states, it, of course, acquires an appropriation water right, but the right thus acquired is no
different from that acquired by any private person and is
subject to the laws of the state in which it is situated.
The appropriation system came into being because of
scarcity of water, due in turn to insufficiency of rain fall.
Somewhere Shakespeare tells us that it rains every day. The
great Shakespeare may have known his England but he did
not know the semi-arid regions of the West. Buddha attempts to comfort the faithful by saying that if there be but
one righteous man, the rain will fall for his sake, but the
great Buddha did not know how many unrighteous men
there are beyond the Missouri.
Waters are so scarce in the sunset land that we fight for
them, frequently with our fists. Murder is not usual in
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the West. We are an orderly people. But when it does
occur we are not surprised to find a controversy over water
as one of its causes.
Nearly all of these states have declared, through the
National Reclamation Association, their opposition to bills
setting up regional Authorities or satrapies, telling the states
how they are to operate their water systems, and how new
rights are to be created and old ones administered.
These
are things that the states of the West will determine for themselves. They will be found opposing, as all states ought to
oppose, any bill that contains an assertion of general government ownership or control.
The Corps of Army Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Forest Service are entrenched in the country's confidence and esteem. The recently created Soil Conservation
Service also is coming into its own. All of these agencies
should have our cooperation. Indeed, they should have also
our protection against functional invasions.
The Congress alone should determine when and where
on interstate streams federally-aided projects for the use of
water should be located. It is only in that body that the
affected states have the chance to be heard before committees,
with their Senators and Congressmen as their helpers and
protectors.
Allocation by Executive or Department Order, now
happily discarded, should never have been inaugurated and
should never be resumed. It already has done harm to several states not receiving the projects thus located, through
failure to give them hearings and to insure protection as to
their fair share of the interstate water.
That the Congress should determine where water projects are to be located is part of representative democracy itself. Ballots alone do not constitute democracy. There
must be in addition the active participation by the legislative
representatives, thus elected, in framing the laws and policies
under which the people are to live. This alone is real representative Democracy-this alone the Democracy that will
long endure.

1
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JUSTICE AS SHE IS * * *
By

COBB, Attorney, Durango, Colo.
COLORADO
CITY OF ......- . ---------------

HOWELL W.

Office of Police Magistrate
February 23rd, 1938
AGREEMENT: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This agreement entered into this 23rd day of February, A. D.
by Police Magistrate,
1938, by and between the city of
-------------- party of
party of the first part; and
-----------------------the second part, to-wit:
For and in consideration by the party of the first part to the party
of the second part, the suspension of the sum of $5.00 of the fine
imposed and the jail sentence of fifteen (15) days, same being part of
fine and all of jail sentence given on the 22nd day of February, A. D.
1938, by the party of the first part to the party of the second part,
account of penalty on complaint filed by Chief of Police
of the city of ------------------------party of the second part agrees to make
The said ----------------------payment of the balance of fine in the sum of $7.50 on or before
April 1st, 1938.
Furthermore; during the residence in the city of

-

--

by the party of the second part for a period of six months not to
imbibe in any intoxicating liquor in any public place, or in any private
room or residence and then go henceforth into any public place or any
public thoroughfare within the city of ..........-....

..........

For any viola-

is to forfeit any and all
---------tion of this provision the said
concessions made by the party of the first part, as a parole as outlined
Also will be subject to such
in paragraph two of this agreement.
further penalty for such violation as in the opinion of the court the
offense shall justify.
party of the second, depart from
Should the said ----------------------the city of

--

----

-

during this six month period this agreement

shall remain in full force and effect, and also for an aggregate period
or any portion thereof of the six months upon the return of the said
and.--,-........ party of the second part.
........
I, and each of us, have read all of the foregoing and am signing
same with my (our) own free will.
Witness our hands and seals this 23rd day of February, A. D.
1938.
Party of the first part.
W itness:
......
of the second part.

---Party

Chief of Police.
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ALL TECHNICAL LAND TITLE EXAMINERS, PLEASE
NOTE-BACK TO THE VERY BEGINNING.

By H. A. FEDER of the Denver Bar
In response to a request from a New York law firm, a New Orleans
attorney recently rendered an opinion on the title to a tract of land in
Louisiana.
Back came a letter from New York saying that the opinion
was 0. K. as far as it went, but that title to the property prior to 1803
had not been covered satisfactorily and here is what the New Orleans
lawyer wrote:
"Please be advised that in 1803 the United States of America
acquired the territory of Louisiana from the Republic of France by
purchase.
The Republic of France in turn had acquired title from the
Spanish Crown by conquest, the Spanish Crown originally having
had its title by virtue of the discoveries of one Christopher Columbus,
a Genoese sailor, who had been duly authorized to embark upon his
Isabella, before
voyage of discovery by Isabella, Queen of Spain.
granting such authority, had obtained the sanction of his Holiness, the
Pope: the Pope is the vicar on earth of Jesus Christ; Jesus Christ is the
Son and Heir-Apparent of God; God made Louisiana."

DID YOU BITE?
He came to my office on urgent business and was soon ushered
in.
He prefaced his business conversation by reminding me of our
previous acquaintance, campaign work together, etc. I remembered (?)
and was eloquent with appreciation.
He had a letter from a friend at Julesburg who had suffered a
serious personal injury and needed a lawyer. All the local attorneys
were afraid of the soulless corporation, guilty of the tort. His friend
had heard of me (hurrah) and wanted my friend and caller to see
me and learn whether or not I would take the case.
I took a pencil pad,
I leaned forward.
I was deeply interested.
got his statement, made a sketch as he directed, and placed a red "X"
to mark the spot.
He was going to Julesburg the following Sunday to bring my
I opened my desk book and
near-client to Denver for a consultation.
Business!
noted the engagement-"2:30 P. M. December 20th."
My split
Expense $75.00, Net $4,925.00.
Damages $5,000.00.
$2,462.50!!
My suppressed appreciation was oozing out.
He was leaving.
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"By the way,"
He had opened the office door. Then he remembered!
he said, in broken English, as he closed the door and turned back to
my desk. "I will need gas and oil for that trip to Julesburg. I have
just $2.00 and wondered if you could let me have $2.50 to make out
my expense.
That was six weeks ago. He has not returned with the client.
N. 0. SUCKER.
I didn't bite. Did you?

PLAY THIS ON YOUR "PIONA"
Dear Sir:
Reciving your letter saying I owe the

-_--

Music Co. of

Denver Colo. One hundred fifty two dollars and ten cents. ($152.10)
for a piona and bench. I do not owe them that amount. I only
I still have the shecks that
owe them twenty five dollars ($25.00)
I payed them and also have the receive that they send back to me. and
also payed them Ten dollars ($10.00) in cash when I received the
piona. and I did not want the piona in the first but they brought it
here so I took it. And also have a lot of witness. IYou can not
sue me in Nebraska. because I live in Kansas I got my lawer, and
also have all my receives. And if you want to take it coutr court if
you are willing.
YOURS TRULY
MR. BLANK

HAIGLER, NEBR.

HAVE YOU BIFURCATED AN INFINITESIMAL FILAMENT
RECENTLY? IT CAN'T BE DONE.
"The opposed argument is that because the result of the damaging
force operating during employment, did not come until later, although
it arrived almost immediately and without independent intervening
cause, there was no accident during the employment.
"That is to attempt bifurcation of a filament too infinitesimal to
be split. The purpose of a law is not to be defeated by such snares of
naive sophistry. Ueltschi vs. Ice Company, 276 N. W. 220.
In other words, we would not be indulging in a violent presumption to assume that the scintillating omnilucence of the Court detected
(Paging
the Boeotian mediocrity of the argument frowned upon.
Al Vogl.)

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-JURISDICTION-INTER and INTRASTATE-Consolidated Freight, et al. vs. Walker-No. 14285-

Decided May 9, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. George
F. Dunklee, Judge. Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Where the facts show that the claimant was injured
while handling a shipment in intrastate commerce and not in interstate commerce, although 35 to 40% of the shipments his employer
carried were in interstate commerce, he is entitled to the benefits of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
2. "Carriers conducting a business that has the aspect of both
interstate and intrastate operations, cannot claim to be engaged in either,
to the exclusion of the other."
3. The determination of the character of a carrier's business, for
jurisdictional purposes under the act, depends upon the specific engagement and work at the time involved. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
AUTOMOBILE

GUEST STATUTE-WILLFUL

AND WANTON NEGLI-

GENCE-Pupke vs. Pupke-No. 14 2 21-Decided May 9, 19 3 8District Court of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, JudgeReversed.
HELD:
1. Where it appears that the daughter of plaintiff was
driving car carefully and at 12 miles an hour, and in order to go around
a rock slide on part of the road, got too close to the opposite side of
the road, the ground gave way, and the car tumbled into a ravine,
injuring all of the parties in the car, there is no showing of willful
and wanton disregard of the rights of the others such as to make the
daughter responsible to the mother for injuries thus occasioned.
2. This is so, although the defendant took off her glasses while
driving, was "peevish" and "pig-headed" because the others in the
car induced her to give up her desire to go farther on the same road.
3. Willington vs. Hiedloff, 96 Colo. 581, 586, 45 P. (2nd)
937, is controlling. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE-DUTY TO NON-RESIDENTS OF CITY-EVIDENCE--City and County of Denver vs.

Pilo--No. 14204-Decided May 9, 1938-District Court of
Adams County-Hon. Charles E. Herrick, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
Plaintiff secured a verdict of $3,870 for damages to
his crop of celery, beets, turnips and to the land on which they grew,
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alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence in excavating
above and along a five foot pipe runninginto the South Platte River
through a dyke, and in leaving the excavation open on Saturday afternoon with no intention of doing further work until the following
Monday morning, during which interval flood waters coming down
the river, the excavation being open, overflowed plaintiff's land.
HELD: " 1. The City was under no duty to improve or maintain the channel of the river or the dyke, hence, negligence cannot be
predicated on any such failure.
2. As long as the City did not subject plaintiff's land to a
greater burden or hazard from flood than that to which it was subject
with the channel in its natural state, it could improve, maintain or
change the channel without liability to plaintiff.
3.
The facts show that plaintiff's land would have been inundated by the flood even if the channel of the river had been left in its
natural state. Plaintiff did not show that the interference with the
natural flow of the river or the failure to maintain the improvement
increased the flood hazard to plaintiff's land.
4. It is not incumbent on the City to show the extent of inundation by direct evidence. Competent circumstantial evidence is
admissible to show that the flood waters were of such proportion or
height that it would have overflowed the plaintiff's lands even if the
dyke had not been broken. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.

HABEAS CORPUS-PAROLE-VIOLATION-COMPUTATION

OF TIME

PRISONERS-In re: Weir-No. 14333-Decided
May 2, 1938-District Court of Fremont County-Hon. James
L. Cooper, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Where a prisoner has been released on parole, he is
entitled to the deduction of time from his sentence for performing
faithfully the duties assigned him during his imprisonment, as under
section 73, 1935, C.S.A., C. 131.
2. But he is not entitled to the credit of time off for being a
"trusty prisoner."
Such time off is granted only upon approval of the
warden where the prisoner conducts himself in accordance with the
rules of the prison and performs his work in a creditable manner, under
the terms of section 74, 1935 C.S.A., C. 131.
3. Where a parolee violates his parole, he may not claim that
his sentence was fully served at the time of such violation by contending that his original sentence had expired, if, in so computing the time,
he includes the time off contemplated by the statute allowing good time
to "trusty prisoners."
EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
-TRUSTY
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Quo WARRANTO-CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS-PUBLIC CORPORATIONS-TAXATION-DUE PROCESS-People ex rel. Rogers, Attorney General vs. Letford, et al.-No. 14254-Decided May 2,

1938-OriginalProceedings in Quo Warranto-WritDischarged.
FACTS: Attorney General instituted original proceeding ifi quo
warranto to try the right of respondents to occupy the office and exercise the duties of directors of Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District.
HELD:
1. Such action is permissible under Sec. 3, Article VI
of the Constitution, is of the nature of a common law proceeding
searching the entire record, and is not limited by sections 321 to 330
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. Where the plea and answer of the respondents is a justification of the right to exercise and hold their office as directors of the
conservancy district, a decision requires the judicial determination of
the validity and constitutionality of the water conservancy act, Chap.
266, S.L. 1937.
3. When an act of the legislature is attacked on the ground of
unconstitutionality, the question presented is not whether it may be
voided, but whether it is possible to uphold it.
4. Every presumption will be indulged in favor of the legislation and only clear and demonstrable usurpation of power will authorize judicial interference with legislative action.
5. While a legislative declaration that the contemplated conservancy district "shall be a political subdivision of the State of Colorado and a body corporate with all the powers of a public or municipal
corporation," is not conclusive upon a court, it must be seriously regarded in the construction of an act.
6. The Court must also consider the purpose of the law, not
only as disclosed by its words, but also in the light of the physical
conditions of the State, its needs and the character and extent of the
projected benefits.
7. The objects of the act are of sufficient public benefit and advantage to the people of Colorado as a whole to constitute a public
purpose and the water conservancy districts authorized thereby are
state agencies and public corporations.
8. " 'Public corporations are all those created specially for public purposes as instruments or agencies to increase the efficiency of government, supply public wants and promote public welfare.' "
9. The water conservancy districts sanctioned by the act are
"quasi-municipal corporations."
10. " 'In the absence of constitutional limitations, the state
legislature may create any kind of a corporation to aid in the administration of public affairs and endow such corporation and its officers
with such powers and functions as it may deem necessary.' "
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11.
The public character of the water conservancy district is
the occasion for the difference under the rule which permits it to impose
and collect taxes, and prohibits irrigation districts from so doing.
12. It is the general rule that special assessments cannot exceed
the benefits conferred, but it is erroneous to assume that the district
created by the act is a special assessment district for a local purpose,
and that such tax in reality is a special assessment.
13. The power of general taxation for public purposes does not
infringe upon the due process clause of the federal or state constitutions.
14. "As a general proposition special assessments are permitted
by authorized governmental agencies upon the theory that the property
against which they are levied derives some peculiar benefit by reason
of the projected improvement different from that enjoyed by other
property in the community in which the improvement is to be made."
15. The special taxes which may be imposed under the act are
unique in character and are not directly analogous to special assessments as they are generally known in ordinary local improvement districts. The difference is that under the act, the liability for the assessment can arise only by the voluntary act of the persons affected; whereas, in ordinary cases, the special assessments are imposed upon the property owners involuntarily on the basis of the benefit fixed by some
public board or authority.
16. Even if assessments provided by the act are deemed to be
special assessments, there is still no violation of the due process clauses,
for such clauses are fully complied with when the property owner is
afforded an opportunity to be heard and test the validity of a special
assessment and the proportion of the general cost of the improvement
which shall be assessed against his property.
17. If the contract creating the liability for special taxes included a provision to the effect that the applicant will also answer for
deficiencies and defaults in the district, the subsequent imposition of
assessments to cover these items against such an applicant is not a violation of due process of law since the liability arose through the voluntary act of the party charged.
18. Section 21 of the act grants to the property owners the right
to appeal from a decision of the board fixing annual assessments. The
function of the Court in the determination of this question is purely
judicial, and this provision of the act does not contravene the constitutional requirement of the separation of the three departments of
government.
19. The district Court's jurisdiction, in creating a district under
the act which extends beyond the limits of the Court's judicial district,
cannot be successfully attacked, since no territorial limit is fixed by
the constitution.
20. The act is not unconstitutional because it provides that the
government of the conservancy district reposes in a board of directors
to be appointed by the District Court. The constitution does not
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guarantee that every citizen residing within the district is entitled to
vote for corporate or quasi-municipal officers.
The legislature may
create a quasi-municipal corporation and provide for the manner of its
administration and the personnel of its officers in any manner it may see
fit.
21.
The Board of Directors governing the district is not such a
"special commission" within the provisions of the constitution prohibiting the general assembly from delegating the power to levy taxes
to any special commission.
22. Sec. 8, Article XI of the Constitution does not apply for it
relates only to cities and towns and prohibits them from contracting
loans or debts without submitting the questions to its electors; it has
no application to an independent entity such as this conservancy district.
23. Debts contracted by municipalities for the supplying of
water to a city or town are excepted by the constitutional provision
prohibiting the contracting of loans or debts without a vote of the
electors.
24. The question of the priority of tax liens is for legislative
determination and it is permissible for the legislature to place the district
taxes on a parity with the general, state, county, school district and
municipal taxes.
25. The act does not transgress the rule that the district may
not enter into a partnership with a private or public corporation.
26. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the
legislature from conferring upon the district, in the first instance, the
right to determine the charge to be made for the sale or leasing of water.
EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
ALIMONY-Curry vs. Curry-No. 14302-Decided May 2, 1938District Court of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunhlee, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: Where Court orders defendant to pay wife $55.00 per
month alimony, and it appears that the wife has been thrifty and not
extravagant, and still needs the $55.00 per month, it is error for the
trial Judge to reduce the required payments to $30.00 per month upon
a showing that defendant remarried, purchased a car, owes bills, and
that plaintiff earns $25.00 per month. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland, concur.
FIND'NGS-JUDGMENT

ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE-REPLEVIN-

PRAYER-EVIDENCE-Melnich, et al. vs. Bowman, etc.-No.
14316-Decided May 2, 1938-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon.
Joseph J. Walsh, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Where findings and judgment of the trial Court are
based upon conflicting testimony, and there is sufficient competent testimony to sustain the findings, the judgment will not be set aside.
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2. It is proof of the facts under the allegations of the complaint,
and not the prayer, that determines the relief to be given, and Court
was not in error in granting a money judgment for conversion of
property where the prayer was for judgment of possession of the property or for value thereof.
3. A stipulation, signed by the respective counsel for the same
parties in a bankruptcy proceedings, dealing with the same property,
was admissible here as cumulative evidence.
4. Whatever may have been the deficiencies of proof at the time
defendants' motion for a nonsuit was interposed, such deficiencies were
supplied by evidence offered by defendants in their own behalf.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Knous specially concur.

Stores, Inc.
vs. Colorado Milling and Elevator Company-No. 14296-Decided May 2, 1938-District Court of Denver-Hon. George F.
Dunklee, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: It is error to dismiss a cross-complaint upon demurrer
where the former sets up that defendant purchased certain products
from plaintiff at a price which included the factor of the Federal
Government's "processing Tax;" that the tax was held unconstitutional;
that it was only to be a part of the purchase price if the tax proved to
be constitutional. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Bakke, dissent. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
PLEADINGS-DEMURRER-CROSS-COMPLAINT-Security

JUSTICE

OF

THE

PEACE

-

JURISDICTION

-

COGNOVIT

NOTES

EQUITY-PROCESS-Sarchet us. Phillips-No. 14327-Decided
May 2, 1938--County Court of Larimer County-Hon. Albert
P. Fischer, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. Where suit is brought on note before justice of the
peace, and a member of the Colorado Bar confesses judgment in accordance with the provisions of the note, judgment may be entered
against defendant without the issuance of summons.
2. The justice had the right -to issue execution and garnishment
and have paid into Court the amount due defendant from garnishee
defendant, although such amount was in excess of $300.00.
3.
If the defendant had defenses such as statute of limitations,
payment, etc., he still has his remedy in equity. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Bouck concurs in
the conclusion.
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GARNISHMENT-TRAVERSE-FINAL ORDER-APPEAL AND ERROR-

Steele vs. Revielle, et al.-No. 14319-Decided April 25, 1938
-District Court of Weld County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark,
Judge-Writ of Error Dismissed.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error was served in Denver with a garnishee
summons issued by the District Court of Weld County. She answered
in proper time denying any indebtedness. Defendant in error traversed
the garnishee answer but did not file traverse until after statutory 10
day period elapsed. Plaintiff in error then moved the Court for an
order discharging her as garnishee and for an order striking the traverse.
On denial of both, exceptions were taken, the proceedings stayed pending a review to determine whether or not the denial of the motion to
discharge as garnishee was a final judgment which she was entitled to
have reviewed on writ of error.
1. The code provision states: "If the plaintiff fails to
HELD:
reply within the time aforesaid (ten days), he shall be deemed to have
accepted the answer of the garnishee as true, and judgment may be entered accordingly."
2. No final judgment was entered against the garnishee, and
nothing exists at this time which would subject her to any loss, for
it may be that no judgment will ever be entered against her. IN
DEPARTMENT.

Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT-MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS-JOINDER OF
CAUSES OF ACTION-Norton vs. Ray-No. 14326-Decided

April 25, 1938-County Court of Weld County-Hon. Robert
G. Strong, Judge-Afflrmed.
FACTS:

Attachment suit brought in Justice Court to collect

$300.00 for delinquent rent. Plaintiff obtained judgment and was
successful in reaching $300.00 in the hands of the garnishee defendant.
On appeal to the County Court, the same judgment was entered. Defendant contended that plaintiff was indebted to him on a promissory
note in the sum of over $800.00; that there was due him on open
account for monies advanced and for merchandise $840.00; that there
was an action pending in the District Court in which this defendant
had sued plaintiff and her husband on said note. The evidence disclosed that defendant had made payments on rent and had sold plaintiff merchandise on open account, but he admitted that he had not
paid plaintiff rent for the three months involved.
1. Where one maintains that he has made payments on
HELD:
rent and has sold merchandise on open account to landlord, but admits
that he had not paid the rent for the months involved in the suit, such
admission amounts to a confession of judgment.
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2. While it is desirable to avoid the multiplicity of suits, Colorado is recognized as a state liberal in the construction of its code provisions relative to the joinder of actions, and under these circumstances,
the plaintiff should not be compelled to rely on application to amend
the answer in the District Court after the issues therein were joined.
3.
It is doubtful that the defendant could have been compelled
to join this cause of action with her defense in the District Court for
the case in the latter Court was against the husband and wife jointly,
while this action is by the wife alone.
"A cause of action which accrues to a husband and wife jointly cannot be joined with one which
accrues to one or the other alone."
4.
The Code provision (1935 C.S.A., Vol. 1, c. 4, p. 158,
sec. 76) concerning the joinder of causes of action is not mandatory.
It says plaintiff "may" unite, not he "must" unite.
IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur.

NEGLIGENCE-AUTOMOBILES-GUESTS-STATEMENTS AS TO RESPONSIBILITY MADE BY DRIVER OF CAR-Bashor vs. Bashor, et
a[-No. 14154-Decided April 25, 1938-District Court of
Boulder County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs procured judgment for damages occasioned
by reason of the death of their son resulting from injuries sustained
by the latter while a guest in the automobile which defendant was
driving.
HELD:
1. Where it appears: that the driver of a car was a
close friend and relative of the deceased; that he was on friendly terms
with all the occupants of his car; that no protest was made by anyone
as to the speed or manner in which he was driving; that no one of the
passengers felt any apprehension of danger; that the driver steered the
car with his left hand and operated the dial of his radio with his right
hand while driving about 45 miles per hour at night on a state highway; that his inattention to the road was incidental to his attempt to
locate a radio station broadcasting a program; that an accident occurred
while he was so doing, the most that may be made out is negligence,
and certainly not "wilful and wanton disregard to the rights of others,"
such as to make driver responsible under the Guest Statute.
2.
The statement of the defendant that he was responsible for
the accident; that it was caused by his recklessness; that he was indifferent to the consequences while engaged in driving the car; etc., are
mere conclusions as to legal effect of his conduct and therefore not properly taken into consideration as evidence.
EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Burke specially
concurring.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissenting. Mr. Justice Holland not
participating.
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APPEAL FROM JUSTICE COURT-DOCKET FEE-Bullington, et al.
vs. Root-No. 14317-Decided April 18, 1938--County Court
of Moffat County-Hon. J. W. Self, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Root, recovered a judgment against the
defendants in the Justice Court and the latter appealed to the County
Court, paying a docket fee of $8.50.
Plaintiff moved to dismiss the
appeal because the required docket fee had not been paid within twenty
days after the approval of the appeal bond, contending that the statu-

tory docket fee was $13.50.
HELD:
1. Appeals from justice and county court are "not
specifically mentioned," in the statute, and the last provision for a
docket fee of $7.50 covers that class.
IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice Knous, concur.
CRIMINAL LAW - OBJECTIONS-INFORMATION-JURY-STATUTES
-- STIPULATION-Miller vs. The People in the Interest of Verna
Edwin and Helen Hendrickson-No. 14247-Decided April 18,
1938-County Court of Pueblo County-Hon. Hubert Glover,
Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
These parties appeared in reverse order in the trial Court
where Alex H. Miller was joined with plaintiff in error.
Ruth Park, a probation officer, filed a petition against defendants
alleging that they "encouraged, caused and contributed to the delinquency" of said Verna Edwin and Ellen Hendrickson, minor girls.
Defendant was tried to a jury of six which found her guilty.
At every proper stage of the proceedings, defendant duly objected
on the grounds that the charge should have been brought by information and that defendant was entitled to a trial by a jury of 12.
These
objections were overruled and those rulings were assigned as error.
HELD:
1. Action should have been brought by information
filed by the District Attorney and there should have been a jury of
12, because the action is brought under section 67, Chapter 33, 1935
C.S.A., which is a criminal statute.
2.
The present action is civil, and these assignments, plus the
confessions, are equivalent to a stipulation. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
PERSONAL PROPERTY-CREDITORS--SALE OF CHATTELS-TRANSFER OF- CONTROL-FRAUD-STATUTE-Reed, et al. vs. The
Ordway State Bank-No. 14307-Decided April 18, 1938District Court of Crowley County-Hon. William B. Stewart,
Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
A code action by the bank to recover possession of personal property, which was adjudged.
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Malone was the owner of two certain mules which, in June, 1935,
were delivered to Boget living in the country, who undertook to care
for them in exchange for their use on his ranch. Said arrangement and
possession continued until December 31, 1936, when in an action
before a Justice of the Peace, for debt against Malone, Reed brothers
caused the mules to be attached by a constable.
July 30, 1936, Malone was indebted to the bank on an overdue
obligation for $150.00, in payment of which he gave the bank a bill
of sale for the mules; possession continued in Boget as theretofore,
neither Malone nor the bank doing or saying anything to indicate a
change in ownership had taken place, nor did Reed or Boget or the
constable have knowledge thereof.
The question is, was the sale of the mules to the bank "fraudulent or void" as to Reed.
HELD:
1. Section 14, Chapter 71, 1935 C.S.A., reads as
follows: "Every sale made by a vendor of goods and chattels in his
possession or under his control, and every assignment of goods and
chattels, unless the same be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and
be followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the
things sold or assigned, shall be presumed to be fraudulent and void,
as against creditors of the vendor, or the creditors of the person making
such assignment, or subsequent purchasers in good faith, and this presumption shall be conclusive."
At the time of the sale the chattels
were not in the physical possession of the vendor, but were under "his
The sale was not "accompanied by an immediate delivery,"
control."
nor was it "followed by an actual and continued change of possession
of the things sold," and therefore the sale was void. IN DEPARTMENT.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
BANK COMMISSIONER-REVIEW OF His DECISION--STATUTE-TIME
'FOR REvIEW-McFerson vs. The Western Colorado Power Company-No. 14298-Decided April 18, 1938-District Court of
La Plata County-Hon. John B. O'Rourke, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
McFerson, as State Bank Commissioner, sued out a writ
of error to review a judgment entered against him by the trial Court
in which it allowed preference of a claim of the Western Colorado
Power Company, claimant, to be paid from the assets of a defunct
State Bank.
Plaintiff in error contends that inasmuch as no suit or action had
been commenced within six months from the date of rejection of the
claim for preference, the Court Was without jurisdiction to review the
action of the bank commissioner,
HELD:
1. Section 96, Chapter 18, Vol. 2, 1935 C.S.A., requiring action to be brought within six months after rejection, is controlling of the situation here involved.
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Section 97 for other parties in interest, and therefore claimant was required to commence suit within the six months' period. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Hilliard dissents.
Mr. Justice Knous not participating.
CRIMINAL LAW -

MURDER -

TESTIMONY -

EVIDENCE-Bray

vs.

People of the State of Colorado-No. 14259-Decided April I1,
1938-District Court of Jefferson County-Hon. Samuel W.
Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as defendant,
was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 10 to 12 years on a
verdict of murder in the second degree for killing her husband.
1. The evidence would have supported a verdict of first
HELD:
degree murder, and therefore, its sufficiency to support a second degree
murder cannot be questioned. Conduct which would sustain a finding
of deliberation and premeditation must perforce sustain a finding of
malice.
2. Questions that are remote and indefinite are clearly immaterial
and should be excluded from the record. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke.
ALLOWANCE-In re: Estate of
Charles G. Sheely-Corinne V. Sheely vs. Arthur C. Sheely and
Harry C. Davis-No. 14160-Decided April 11, 1938-District
Court of Jefferson County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, JudgeAffirmed.
Plaintiff in error asks the Court to reverse so much of a
FACTS:
judgment as denied her petition for leave to renounce under her husband's will and to take one-half of his estate instead; and defendants
in error ask the Court to reverse, on their assignment of cross-error,
so much of the judgment as granted a widow's allowance.
1. 1935 C.S.A., Vol. 4, Chapter 176, Sec. 37, proHELD:
viding that a surviving spouse may make an election to take under the
statute and not the will, providing this is done within six months after
the will is admitted to probate, is a mandatory provision and not a
directory one, and therefore, an election to take under the statute, having
been made nine months after the admission of the will to probate, is
too late.
2. The widow's election does not depend either directly or indirectly upon the time of filing an executor's inventory.
3. The lower Court is the fact finding tribunal and its decision
binds the higher Court as to the widow's allowance. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Bakke, Mr. Justice
Knous, and-Mr. Justice Holland concur in so much of the opinion as
approves the District Court's ruling on the widow's allowance, but
dissent as to the remainder.
ESTATES-STATUTES-WIDOW'S
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FRAUD-CAUSE OF ACTION-COMPLAINT--AGENCY-CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS-STATUS QUO-CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
-Longworthy us. Republic Mutual Insurance Company, et al.No. 14208-Decided April 11, 1938-District Court of Denver
-Hon. Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Action in equity to cancel a deed and for reconveyance
of certain real estate on ground of fraud.
HELD:
1. Every reasonable intendment on matters in doubt
must be resolved in favor of the judgment of the trial Court.
2.
All insufficiencies appearing in the Complaint must be resolved against the pleader.
3.
Before it may be concluded that a cause of action has been
stated against a defendant, it must affirmatively appear on the face of
the complaint that he was a party to the fraud or, second, that the
fraud was a result of his procurement, or was perpetrated with his
knowledge and authority.
4. A principal is not bound by false representations of his agent
made without his knowledge, consent, or authority, nor is an officer
of a company bound by representations of the company's agent so made.
5.
The Court will not grant the relief of cancellation of an instrument without the offer to restore the parties to the status quo at
the time of the execution of the instrument sought to be cancelled.
6.
Mere inadequacy of consideration will not give rise to a constructive trust.
7.
Cancellation will not be allowed unless the improvidence or
inadequacy of the price is so great as to furnish of itself convincing evidence of fraud.
8.
An unauthorized alteration of a deed by the grantee or his
privy is not ground for an action by the grantor to set it aside. EN
BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young, dissent.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-PUBLIC REVENUE SERVICE TAX ACT-INTERPRETATION OF REVENUE LAWS-EJUSDEM GENERISNOSCITUR A SOCIIS-Bedford, as Treasurer of the State of Colorado, and Rogers, as Attorney General of the State of Colorado,
vs. Johnson, et al.-No.
--Decided
April 11, 1938District Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
The question for determination is whether the general
warehouse business of defendants in error is subject to the Public
Revenue Service Tax Act of 1937. The District Court decided that
the 1937 act had no application to the business of defendants in error
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and its finding and decree are brought here for review by the State
Treasurer, who is charged with the duty of enforcing the act, and the
attorney general, who was made a party by reason of the provisions
of the Declaratory Judgment Act. The general warehousing business
is not included by name in any part of the act.
HELD:
1. It is a settled rule in the interpretation of revenue
laws that in case of doubt as to their application, the construction must
be in favor of the tax payer and against the taxing power.
2.
The rule of ejusdem generis, to the effect that where words
of general import follow specific designations, the application of the
general language is controlled by the specific, does not apply where the
specific words signify subjects differing greatly from one another.
3.
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis is to the effect that the
meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the
meaning of words associated with it. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Young dissent.

TAXATION-EXEMPTION-CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS-Hanagan
et at us. Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias of the Domain of Colorado-No. 14103-Decided January 10, 1938-District Court
of Otero Count-Hon. William B. Stewart, Judge-Reersed.
HELD:
1. Property laterally adjacent to other property used
strictly for charitable purposes is subject to taxation when such property is used solely for producing revenue and such revenue is not being
produced merely incidentally from property which otherwise is necessary to effect the objects of the organization. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.
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